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ABSTRACT
Despite robust growth in real per capita GDP over the last three decades, the U.S. poverty rate has
changed very little. In an effort to better understand this disconnect, we document and quantify the
relationship between poverty and four different factors that may affect poverty and its evolution over
time: labor market opportunities, family structure, anti-poverty programs, and immigration. We find
that the relationship between the macro-economy and poverty has weakened over time. Nevertheless,
changes in labor market opportunities predict changes in the poverty rate rather well. We also find
that changes in female labor supply should have reduced poverty, but was counteracted by an
increase in the rate of female headship. Changes in the number and composition of immigrants and
changes in the generosity of anti-poverty programs seem to have had little effect.
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1.  Introduction 
 
 
The 1990’s witnessed what are arguably the most dramatic changes in anti-poverty policy 
since Lyndon B. Johnson’s War on Poverty.  The Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
program, which had formerly been the lynchpin of the federal government’s poverty reducing 
efforts, was transformed from a means-tested entitlement program into a program that provides 
transitional assistance and mandates work.  At the same time, assistance to the working poor was 
greatly expanded through substantial increases in the Earned Income Tax Credit. These changes 
were motivated by individuals’ perceptions, and misperceptions, about the poor. Who are the 
poor?  Why has the poverty rate fluctuated over time?  Are the mechanisms that contribute to the 
poverty rate responsive to public policies in a way that will allow individuals to achieve 
economic success?   
This article summarizes what we know about the answers to these questions.  Due to 
space limitations, we focus on poverty among the non-elderly population, since the causes of 
poverty among the elderly and non-elderly are likely to be different.  We document the extent of 
poverty in the United States, describe trends in poverty over the past four decades, and consider 
the degree to which changes in labor market opportunities, government programs and the 
population’s demographic composition can explain these trends.  The degree to which economic 
policy and government programs can “solve” the poverty problem will depend on who the poor 
are, and on how they behave. We show that poverty has no simple cause.  Changes in the poverty 
rate over time reflect complex interactions between demographic trends, government policies 
and labor market conditions.  Designing effective policies to combat poverty will, therefore, 
require careful targeting.   2
A common misperception is that the typical poor person in America is a person of color, 
living in a female-headed family, who is not engaged in the labor force.  In fact, we show that 
none of these perceptions is true:  the modal poor individual is a non-Hispanic white, and most of 
the poor are living in either a married couple family or a family without children.  Half of the 
poor are living in families in which the head worked in the past year. These statistics can be a bit 
misleading, however:  while most of the poor are white, minorities are much more likely to be 
poor.  In 2003, 24% of individuals living in black families were poor, whereas only 8% of 
individuals living in non-Hispanic white families had incomes below the poverty line.  Similarly, 
while more than half of the poor do not live in single parent families, in 2003, the poverty rate 
among individuals living in single parent families was nearly six times the poverty rate of 
individuals living in married couple families.  
Because family structure is so highly correlated with poverty, changes in family structure 
over time have contributed to changes in the poverty rate.  In particular, over the past four 
decades, increases in the fraction of families headed by a single parent have put substantial 
upward pressure on the poverty rate.  If all else had been held constant over the past forty years, 
changes in family structure would have led to a rise in the poverty rate from 13% (in 1967) to 
17% (in 2003).  Other demographic changes have had a minor effect.  For example, although the 
fraction of the population that are foreign born is small, increases in their share of the population 
since 1980, together with increases in their likelihood of being poor, have increased the poverty 
rate by about 0.3 percentage points more than it otherwise would have been.   An important 
question is how the higher poverty rates that are predicted by these demographic shifts have been 
avoided.  We find that government programs aimed at alleviating poverty have had limited 
impact.     3
We also show that labor market opportunities and economic growth are very important 
determinants of poverty, although their relationship may be more complicated than many people 
believe.  A traditional view has been that economic growth is closely tied to living standards, and 
that poverty can be reduced by policies that stimulate the economy.  This view came under fire 
during the early 1990’s, however, after a decade during which the poverty rate continued to rise 
despite continued economic growth.   We find that since 1980 there has been a substantial 
weakening of the relationship between labor market opportunities and poverty rates, however, 
unemployment rates, median wages, and inequality actually do a very good job of predicting 
changes in poverty over the past two decades.    On the other hand, holding the macro-economy 
constant, increases in women’s labor force participation should have lead to a reduction in the 
poverty rate that we do not observe.  After all of these factors are taken into account it looks as 
though poverty “should” have declined by more than it did. 
In sum, poverty rate dynamics reflect a complicated set of interactions between 
demographic trends and labor market conditions—a set of interactions that we do not yet fully 
understand.  Unlike the conventional wisdom, we find that macroeconomic variables correlate 
well with changes in poverty since the 1980’s.  During the last twenty five years, however, there 
has been tremendous growth in female labor supply, coupled with increases in female headship, 
and these two changes have pulled the poverty rate in opposite directions.  Our findings suggest 
that a better understanding of how the trends in women’s labor force participation and family 
structure are linked would provide valuable insight into the question of why the poverty rate has 
not fallen more.    4
2.  The Facts on Poverty in the United States 
The risk of poverty varies dramatically across the population, and has varied significantly 
over time. In this section, we summarize some basic facts about poverty in the US, relying on a 
combination of previously published data from the Census Bureau and our own tabulations based 
on Current Population Survey data from 1967 through 2003.  Throughout the paper we measure 
individual poverty rates (the alternative is to measure poverty rates among families).  To measure 
poverty we use the Census Bureau definition under which individuals are considered poor if their 
total family pre-tax money income in a given year is below the poverty threshold for their family 
size and age composition.  By construction, all persons in the same family have the same poverty 
status.   Poverty thresholds are based on an index developed in the 1960s that was intended to 
cover the costs of basic needs for a family. In 2004, the poverty threshold for a family of four 
was roughly $19,000, and for a single individual it was approximately $10,000.  This definition 
of poverty has been used as the official measure since the 1960s (with only minor modifications) 
although some aspects of it are controversial. In section 3 we discuss some of these issues, and 
the measure’s key limitations. 
 
A.  Trends over time in US Poverty 
  Trends in poverty from 1959 to 2003 for all individuals in the US, and for elderly 
(defined as individuals aged 65 and older) and non-elderly (individuals under 65 years of age) 
persons are shown in Figure 1.  Focusing on the trend for all individuals, there is a dramatic 
decline in poverty during the 1960s. Overall poverty rates are at 22.4% in 1959, but are cut 
almost in half, to 12.1% by 1969.  Over the next two decades, poverty rates gradually increase, 
averaging 11.8% over the 1970s, and 13.8% over the 1980s.  During the long expansion of the   5
1990s poverty rates decline and are at 12.5% by 2003.  There are clear business cycle effects, 
with poverty rates rising during recessions and declining with expansions.  
  The trend in poverty among the elderly looks quite different.  In 1959, 35.8% of elderly 
individuals were poor.  As was true for the population as a whole, the elderly saw dramatic 
declines in their rates of poverty during the 1960s, and by 1969 the poverty rate for this group 
had declined by ten percentage points to 25.3%.  In contrast to the overall population, however, 
elderly poverty rates continued to decline through the mid-1980s, so that by 1985, the poverty 
rate for this group was at 12.8%.  Additional declines occurred during the second half of the 
1990s.   
  As Figure 1 makes clear, long-run trends in poverty differ dramatically for elderly and 
non-elderly populations in the US.  In 1959 the elderly poverty rate was 1.75 times the rate for 
the overall population; by 2003 the elderly poverty rate was about 20% below that for all 
individuals.  Many have attributed the lengthy decline in poverty among the elderly to the 
expansion of Social Security.  Recent work by Engelhardt and Gruber (2004), for example, 
shows that expansions of Social Security benefits over time can explain virtually all of the 
decline in elderly poverty rates between 1967 and 2001.  Given the divergence between trends in 
elderly and overall poverty, and probable differences in the underlying causes of poverty among 
these two groups, the remainder of this paper focuses on poverty among non-elderly individuals. 
As shown in Figure 1, the time pattern of poverty rates among the non-elderly closely 
follows the overall pattern.  At the beginning of the period, the non-elderly rate is slightly below 
that for all individuals, but from the 1970s forward the two poverty rates track one another 
closely.  This should guarantee that our focus on non-elderly poverty does not dramatically affect 
the conclusions we draw about the factors that drive changes in poverty over time.   6
  Because poverty among children is often of particular interest, Figure 1 also shows the 
trend in poverty among those 18 or younger. During the 1960’s, the poverty rate among children 
declined somewhat more dramatically than poverty rates overall.  Children also experienced a 
sharper increase in poverty rates during the 1970s and 1980s than did all non-elderly individuals, 
reaching approximately 23% during the business cycle troughs in 1982 and 1992.  Since 1992, 
children’s poverty rates have declined along with overall rates.   
  Trends in non-elderly poverty rates by race and ethnicity are displayed in Figure 2.  
Among blacks and Hispanics, poverty rates are much higher than in the overall population.  The 
increase in poverty rates at the end of the 1970s is particularly dramatic for blacks and Hispanics.  
The other striking aspect of the trends in Figure 2 is the relatively steep decline in black and 
Hispanic poverty rates that began in the early to mid-1990s.  Black poverty rates fell from 33 to 
22 percent over the course of the 1990s, with Hispanic rates declining by a similar amount. 
 
B.  A snapshot of poverty rates by individual and family characteristics, 2003 
We next ask what poverty rates looked like in 2003 (the most recent year for which CPS data 
are available) for individuals with different characteristics. Table 1 shows poverty rates for non-
elderly individuals, by a variety of individual and family characteristics.  Our tabulations are 
based on data from the March 2004 Current Population Survey (CPS) which provides 
information on income and poverty for calendar year 2003.  In that year, 12.8% of all non-
elderly individuals lived below the poverty line and 17.6 percent of children lived in families 
with incomes below the poverty line.  Because children always live in households with at least 
some non-earning members (the children themselves) poverty rates are generally higher among 
children relative to adults.     7
Women are more likely to be poor than men; in 2003, the poverty rate for males was 11.7% 
and for females was 13.9%.  This relatively small difference is driven by the fact that men and 
women live together in most families, and so have the same family income and poverty standard.  
When the populations is divided using characteristics of the head of household, or family 
structure, (rather than on the basis of individual characteristics)  the differences in poverty rates 
are more dramatic.  In the few rows of Table 1, we show individual poverty rates for individuals 
living in families with three different family structures: married, single with children, and single 
without children.  The poverty rate for individuals for whom the head of the family is married 
was 7%.  In contrast, among individuals in families with an unmarried head and children present 
(83% of whom are female unmarried heads) the poverty rate was 40.3%.  Finally, among those 
with single heads, but no children present, the 2003 poverty rate was 17.9%.   
  As shown in Figure 2 above, race and ethnicity are also strongly related to the probability 
of living in poverty.  The 2003 poverty rates among blacks and Hispanics were 24.3% and 
22.5%, respectively, nearly 3 times the poverty rate for whites.  There are also differences in 
poverty rates by native versus immigrant status.  Individuals who were born in the US have a 
poverty rate of 11.8%, while those who are immigrants have a rate of 17.4%. 
  Finally, education is a strong predictor of poverty status.  Among individuals living in 
families in which the head has less than a high school education, 31.3% are below the poverty 
line, compared to just 9.6% of those whose head has at least a high school education.  
 
C.  A snapshot of the poor in 2003 
While the summary statistics in Table 1 describe the risk of being poor across different 
groups, it is also useful to look at the characteristics of the current poor because various public   8
programs, and much policy attention, are focused on “the poor” as a distinct group. This provides 
a somewhat different picture of poverty, because it combines information on the distribution of 
characteristics in the population with relative poverty rates such as those shown in Table 1.  In 
keeping with our focus on the non-elderly poor, Table 2 lists the fraction of the non-elderly poor 
who have a variety of individual and family characteristics.  For comparison, we also show the 
fraction of the total non-elderly population with these same characteristics.   
The first row of Table 2 shows that the poor as a group are younger than the overall 
population, with children making up approximately 40% of the non-elderly poor, compared to 
29% of the overall non-elderly population. The slightly higher poverty rates among women, who 
are roughly half of the population, of course mean that the poor are also disproportionately 
female (55% of the non-elderly poor).  Family structure is heavily skewed towards single parents 
with children.  Almost 40% of the poor are living as part of a single parent family, although 
persons in such families make up only 14.4% of the total non-elderly population.  
The racial and ethnic composition of the non-elderly poor is disproportionately minority, but 
the modal poor individual is a white non-Hispanic.  In 2003, 42.2% of the non-elderly poor were 
white, 24.1% black, and 26.8% Hispanic.  In the overall non-elderly population, whites make up 
65.7%, blacks make up 12.6% and Hispanics 15.1%.  17.4% of the non-elderly poor are 
immigrants. 
 Another issue of policy interest is the extent to which the poor are attached to the labor 
force.  The bottom row of Table 2 shows that half of the poor were in a family whose household 
head worked in the past year.  In contrast, in the population overall, 81% of household heads 
worked.  
    9
D.  Short- versus long-term poverty 
One dimension of poverty that cannot be captured using repeated cross-sectional data from 
the CPS is its typical duration.  A stable poverty rate of 0.10 can result from the same 10 percent 
of individuals living below the poverty line from one year to the next, or from a different set of 
individuals living below the poverty line each year.  If there are consequences to living below the 
poverty line, they are likely to be magnified for individuals who remain in poverty over many 
years.  
  Influential work by Bane and Ellwood (1986) established some basic facts about the 
persistence of poverty in the US.  Bane and Ellwood calculated two alternative measures of 
poverty persistence, and highlighted the distinction between these stock- and flow measures.  
First, they noted that most individuals who ever become poor (a flow measure) will be poor for a 
relatively short period of time. A stock-based measure, in contrast, will show that, among 
individuals who are currently poor, a large fraction will be in the midst of a spell of poverty that 
will last for a long period of time.   
A drawback of the Bane and Ellwood study is that it did not consider multiple poverty 
spells.  Stevens (1999) shows that among those who leave poverty in a given year, there is 
substantial re-entry in future years. The implication of this is that Bane and Ellwood likely  
understate the degree of poverty persistence.  For example, using data from the 1968 through 
1988 waves of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), Stevens shows that approximately 
35% of individuals beginning a spell of poverty will be poor for at least five of the next ten 
years, with about half of these occurring across multiple spells.  
 Table 3 (reproduced from Stevens 1999) presents information on the persistence of 
poverty and how this varies with individual and family characteristics.  Table 3 presents   10
estimates of the probability that individuals will remain poor for five or more of the next ten 
years, and highlights several facts about poverty persistence.  First, children who are born into 
poverty face longer stays than young adults beginning a period of poverty.  The fraction of poor 
children facing very long stays in poverty ranges from 17 to 90%, depending upon race, family 
structure and education of the household head. Among young adults falling into poverty, the 
comparable range is 8 to 64%.  Second, there are large differences in poverty persistence by race, 
education of the family head, and family structure.  For example, 17% of white children who 
enter poverty but are living in two parent families in which the head has at least a high school 
education will face long-term poverty.   At the other extreme, nearly all (90%) of black children 
living with a single, less-educated mother who become poor will be poor for many years. 
 
3.   Issues in Poverty Measurement 
All of the statistics presented in this paper are based on the official definition of poverty 
in the United States.  This is an absolute measure of poverty and reflects the fraction of persons 
or families with income below some threshold.  The poverty thresholds were developed in 1963-
1964 by Mollie Orshansky, an economist at the Social Security Administration, and were 
designated as the official definition of poverty in August 1969
1.   The thresholds were 
constructed by estimating the cost of the Department of Agriculture “economy food plan” for 
different family sizes.  The food cost measures were multiplied by three to construct the poverty 
thresholds.  The multiplier comes from tabulations of the 1955 Household Food Consumption 
Survey which showed that on average, one-third of family after tax income was spent on food.
2   
These thresholds are adjusted each year using changes in the cost of living using the CPI-U.   
                                                 
1 The discussion of the history of the poverty rate comes from Fisher (1992). 
2 A higher multiplier was used for families with less than three persons to reflect the high fixed costs of housing.    11
Otherwise, the official poverty measure has changed little since it was created in 1969.
 3  Here, 
we briefly discuss some important issues in the measurement of poverty with a focus on issues 
relevant to our main question—what explains poverty rates over time. 
  The main alternative to the measure used in the U.S. is relative poverty which, as 
described in Smeeding (this issue), is more commonly used outside the U.S.  Relative poverty 
measures the fraction of persons or families with income below some societal benchmark (e.g., 
50 percent of median income).  A consequence of using relative poverty lines is that a general 
increase in income leads to no measured improvement in poverty. For both absolute and relative 
poverty standards, one could also examine the poverty gap which is difference between the 
poverty threshold and family income.  The aggregate poverty gap is the total income necessary 
to raise all of the country’s poor out of poverty.   
  There are three steps involved in measuring absolute poverty: define the economic unit 
for measuring income (family, household); construct the total income measure for the economic 
unit (before tax or after tax, including in kind benefits or not); and define the poverty thresholds 
for the economic units.  Poverty is then assigned by comparing income with the appropriate 
threshold for each economic unit.  The remainder of this section highlights some important 
issues within these three areas. 
  The economic unit used by the Census is the family—which is defined as all persons 
living in a household who are related by birth, marriage or adoption.
4  A limitation with this 
definition is that changes in living arrangements (with no change in income) can lead to changes 
                                                 
3 Poverty thresholds are now created for family sizes 1 to 9 or more persons and vary depending on the number in 
the family that are less than 18 and, if a one or two person family, whether the head is over 65. Up until 1981, 
separate thresholds were also provided for farm and nonfarm families, and for different family types (female headed 
household or not). 
4 Households, therefore, can consist of multiple families.  Persons living alone or living with other unrelated persons 
form their own single-person economic units for the purposes of assigning poverty.  The only persons not included 
in poverty statistics are unrelated individuals less than age 15 (such as foster children) as they are too young to have 
measured income yet they are not part of any Census family.  In practice this group is quite small.   12
in poverty. For example, if a married couple with a child instead cohabitate, then poverty is 
calculated separately for the mother-and-child “family” and the father. Because of the economies 
of scale that are built in to the poverty thresholds, poverty rates will differ in these two cases 
even if household income does not.  Typically, splitting up the family leads to increases in 
poverty rates.  As another example, if a woman and her child move in with her parents then 
measured poverty will be lower then if the parents and daughter-granddaughter reside separately.  
Given significant changes in marriage, living arrangements, and household composition, these 
changes may be important. 
  We explore the importance of these issues by comparing the official poverty rates to two 
alternatives: a household poverty rate and a “little” family poverty rate.  The household measure 
combines the incomes of all persons living in the household, and crudely gets at the first case 
above.  The “little” family measure splits up the Census (“big”) family into more atomistic units 
and gets at the second case above.  In the three generation example, the mother would be one 
family and the daughter-granddaughter would be another. In each case, we can use the official 
poverty thresholds for the appropriate size of the economic unit.  Figure 3 presents the trends in 
these three measures from 1967-2003 for persons less that 65 using the March CPS.  As 
expected, the little family poverty rates are above and the household level poverty rates are 
below the official poverty rates.  But remarkably, the trends in the poverty rates are very similar 
across the three definitions.  In our analyses, we determine whether or not an individual is poor 
based on the official definition—whether the “big” family that they are living in is poor.   13
  Income used to compute poverty status consists of before-tax money income.  Notably, 
this does not include in kind government benefits such as food stamps and housing subsidies.
5  
Further, it does notinclude the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), which provides cash transfers 
to low income working families as part of the tax system. These omissions may be particularly 
important here because of the substantial increases in the EITC (Hotz and Scholz 2003) as well 
as the rising importance of noncash public assistance benefits (Moffitt 2003).  As expected, 
alternative poverty rates measures that include taxes and in kind benefits, show lower (in some 
cases substantially lower) poverty rates compared to official statistics.
6 However, the trend in 
poverty rates is quite similar across the official and alternative measures (Short et al 1999).   
  In 1995, a report by the National Research Council provided expansive recommendations 
for updating poverty measurement in the United States (Citro and Michael 1995) addressing 
many of the concerns raised above.  The panel recommended updating the measure of family 
resources to include the value of near-cash in kind benefits (such as food stamps, housing 
subsidies, school lunch, and energy assistance) and to subtract income taxes, payroll taxes, out of 
pocket medical costs, work expenses and child care expenses.  The panel also made 
recommendations for changing poverty thresholds including relying on expenditure data on food, 
clothing and shelter, allowing for geographical variation, and updating the threshold each year by 
changes in spending in these three areas (as opposed to general price levels in the CPI-U).  While 
the panel’s report has generated significant discussion, as of this writing there has been no 
change in the official poverty measure.  
 
                                                 
5 A challenge with adding in kind transfers to income is how to value those transfers. In the case of food stamps, it 
seems reasonable to treat benefits as cash.  It is less clear with other benefits such as public housing and public 
health insurance (Medicaid). 
6 Including taxes leads to lower poverty rates because of the EITC, which acts as a negative tax.   14
4.  What Explains Trends in Poverty Rates? 
 
Here we discuss and evaluate four determinants of changes in the poverty rate that have 
been advanced in the literature. As stated above, we focus on the determinants of nonelderly 
poverty rates. In the first section, we examine the impact of labor market opportunities using 
measures of macroeconomic cycles, growth, and inequality. Next we examine the role of 
changes in family structure.  In the third section, we examine the role played by government 
transfer programs such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children or AFDC (now Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families or TANF) and the EITC.  Finally, in the last section we explore 
the role of changes in immigration.  Throughout the discussion, we discuss the existing literature 
and, where possible, provide our own analysis to highlight and extend our knowledge of key 
determinants of trends in poverty. 
 
A. Labor Market Opportunities, Inequality and Macroeconomic Cycles 
  The literature on the “causes” of poverty consistently cites the importance of labor 
market opportunities.  Some of the literature focuses on the poverty rate’s cyclical nature (Hines, 
Hoynes and Krueger 2001, 2005; Hoynes 2000).  Others identify three separate factors 
associated with labor market opportunities—growth, inequality, and macroeconomic cycles—
and explore their contribution to poverty (Blank and Card 1993; Danziger and Gottschalk 1995, 
2004; Freeman 2001; Gottschalk 1997).   Historically, economic expansions have been highly 
correlated with improvements in poverty rates.  During the 1980’s, however, this relationship 
appeared to weaken, with the mid 1980’s expansion being associated with only a modest decline 
in poverty.  In this section we explore the extent to which labor market opportunities can reduce 
poverty.     15
We build on the existing literature by using cross-section/time-series variation in multiple 
labor market opportunity measures over a longer period.  Like many studies, we use regional (as 
opposed to aggregate) variation in labor markets as our source of identifying variation (Blank 
and Card 1993; Danziger and Gottschalk 1995, 2004; Freeman 2001; Gottschalk 1997; Hines, 
Hoynes and Krueger 2001, 2005; Hoynes 2000),
7  focusing on the nine census divisions.  This 
allows us to take advantage of substantial variation in business cycles and labor market 
opportunities both across areas and over time. Further, using regional labor market variation 
allows for us to control for unrestricted time effects in the analysis, which one can not do with 
time series data.  
  We use the 1968-2004 March Current Population Survey (CPS), which provides data on 
employment, earnings and income for the prior calendar year.  The sample size is approximately 
150,000 persons per year.  With nine divisions and 37 years, our sample consists of 333 
observations. 
We estimate the following model relating poverty rates to labor market opportunities: 
Povratejt=α+β1uratejt+β2ln(medwagejt)+β3ln(p50jt/p20jt)+γj+ηt+εjt 
All variables are constructed using the CPS data.  The dependent variable povratejt is the poverty 
rate for all persons less than 65 in division j in year t and is based on the official definition of 
poverty.  In particular, the person’s poverty level is determined by family income and all persons 
                                                 
7 An important issue that arises throughout this literature is whether one should use national or regional (division, 
state, metropolitan area) controls for labor market variables.  The main appeal of using national data is that variables 
are measured precisely and they reflect movements in the aggregate economy.  However, the principle weakness of 
using aggregate data is that it may pick up the influences of unmeasured aggregate variables.  In contrast, using 
regional variation in labor market opportunities leads to an increase in the size of the estimation sample and allows 
for the estimation of models with unrestricted time effects.  The time effects control for the unmeasured aggregate 
variables that are a concern in the aggregate models.  Furthermore, some argue that labor market outcomes are more 
influenced by local variables than national variables (Blanchflower and Oswald 1994, Bartik 1994).   16
in the same family have the same poverty rate.
8  We control for macroeconomic cycles with the 
unemployment rate, uratejt which we calculate with the March CPS sample because the BLS 
Local Area Unemployment statistics do not begin until 1975. 
  We use the real median weekly wage ln(medwagejt) to control for overall income and 
growth in the economy and the ratio of the median weekly wage to the 20
th percentile weekly 
wage, ln(p50/p20)jt, as the measure of inequality. Both the growth and inequality measures are 
specified in logs. Weekly wages are constructed by dividing annual earnings by weeks worked.
9  
In constructing the median and 20
th percentile weekly wages, we limit the analysis to men 
working full-time.  We also drop self-employed individuals, those working without pay or in the 
military, observations with negative weights, and those with very low wages.
10  We limit the 
sample to full-time men because of the desire to specify a price of labor (for a given skill level). 
Because of the enormous rise in women’s labor force participation during this time period (rising 
from 40.8 percent in 1967 to 60.1 percent in 2003), the 20
th or 50
th percentile “worker” may have 
changed significantly over time.  We did not want our wage measures to vary due to this change 
in composition of the working population. 
  There are many measures of inequality used in the literature.  We use the ratio of the 
median to the 20
th percentile to recognize that inequality at low end of the distribution is what 
matters for poverty. Blank and Card (1993), in contrast, use the standard deviation of wages.  
This captures dispersion, but the dispersion will vary in part due to inequality at the upper deciles 
                                                 
8Note that we use the simplified poverty thresholds implemented in 1981 to construct the poverty thresholds for 
years prior to 1981.  This adjustment reflects changes in the CPI whereas the actual thresholds prior to 1981 also 
varied by farm/nonfarm status and family structure. 
9 For survey years 1975 and earlier, the weeks worked variable in the CPS is given within six intervals.  We impute 
weeks within the intervals by assigning the empirical mean within the interval from 1976 (the first year with 
continuous weeks worked).  
10 Specifically, we drop men with weekly earnings less than 128 dollars (in 2003 dollars).  For this full time working 
sample, this is equivalent to having an hourly wage of $3.18/hour (2003$).  This is done to eliminate obvious 
measurement error.   17
of the distribution, which should not matter for poverty.  Finally, the model controls for division 
fixed effects γj and year fixed effects ηt.  The identification in this model comes from variation in 
trends within the divisions. 
  Before presenting the regression estimates, it is useful to examine the trends in these four 
variables over time.  Figure 4 presents the trends in the poverty rate, unemployment rate, and real 
median weekly wage.  The figure shows the strong cyclical component in the poverty rate—with 
relatively higher poverty rates in high unemployment periods such as 1971, 1975, 1983, and 
1993.  It is striking, however, that the rise in poverty rates associated with increasing 
unemployment rates is lower through the early 1970s.  At the same time, increases in real median 
wages are associated with reductions in the poverty rate.  The periods where real wages are 
increasing (1967-1973, 1983-1986, 1996-1999) are also periods with falling poverty rates.  To 
explore this further Figure 5 presents the trends in the poverty rate and inequality.  The patterns 
here are less striking, but it appears that periods of falling inequality (1987-1990, 1991-1996) are 
also periods of falling poverty.  Of course, these trends could be capturing many other influences 
that are not being controlled for.  By using variation across division level labor markets, we can 
control for secular aggregate trends with time fixed effects.  We now turn to the results of the 
regressions. 
  The first three columns of Table 4 present the results from our main analysis.  Column 1 
presents the results from a model that does not include any additional controls.  In column 2 we 
add year fixed effects to control for national trends in the poverty rate.  The coefficient estimates 
produced by this regression come from cross-sectional differences across the divisions regions as 
well as differences in trends across divisions.  Column 3 presents estimates from a model that 
includes both year and division fixed effects, which  allows us to further control for region-  18
specific factors that affect poverty but are constant over time.  The coefficients in this model are 
identified off of within region variation in labor market opportunities relative to the overall 
economy.  Across specifications, all of coefficient estimates are substantive and significant.  
Poverty rates are higher with higher unemployment rates, lower median wages, and higher 
inequality. Specifically, the regression estimates imply that an increase in the unemployment rate 
of 1 percentage point increases the poverty rate by between 0.4 and 0.7 percentage points and a 
ten percent increase in the median wage decreases the poverty rate by about 2 percentage points.  
We can also see that controlling for year and division specific fixed effects has a substantive 
effect on the magnitude of the estimated labor market effects.  In particular, abstracting from 
national trends leads to increases in the estimated impact of the unemployment rate and 
inequality, whereas controlling for fixed regional differences reduces the magnitude of estimated 
unemployment and wage effects.   This implies that there are omitted division variables that are 
leading to an upward bias—other variables associated with high wage, low unemployment states 
that also lead to lower poverty rtes. 
  Inequality also contributes substantially to explaining long-term trends in poverty over 
the past three decades.  The ratio of median wages to the 20
th percentile of wages is positive and 
significantly related to poverty rates across the three specifications in columns 1-3 of Table 4.  
Conditional on both year and division fixed effects, a 10 percent increase in the 50-20 ratio 
(approximately the increase in this inequality measure between 1975 and 1985) leads to an 
increase in the poverty rate of approximately two and half percentage points.  As we show more 
clearly in our predictions below, the virtually continuous increase in wage inequality below the 
median is an important explanation for the upward drift in poverty rates over much of the period 
we study.   19
Relying on within division changes over time clearly eliminates much of the variation in 
labor market opportunities.  The advantage of this approach, however, is that our estimates are 
purged of omitted variables bias resulting from variables common to all regions that are 
changing over time (such as changes in rates of female headship) or fixed differences across 
geographic areas (such as differences in immigrant shares) that might also influence the poverty 
rate.  We, therefore, carry forward the specification that includes year and region fixed effects in 
the remainder of this section. 
The last three columns in Table 4 explore how the impacts of labor market opportunities 
on poverty rates have changed over time.  We split the period into three periods: 1967-1979, 
1980-1989, 1990-2003, roughly coinciding with the calendar decades and including a 
combination of boom and bust years in each sub-period.  These results show quite strikingly that 
the impact of unemployment rates, growth, and inequality weakened after the first period. For 
example, in 1990-2003 the coefficients on the labor market variables are about half of their 
values in the 1967-1979 period.  We return to this point below.   
To explore the importance of the labor market opportunity variables in explaining trends 
in poverty rates, we use the estimates for the full sample period (column 3) to produce 
counterfactual estimates of what the poverty rate would have been if two of the three variables 
capturing labor market opportunities had remained at their 1967 levels and only the third variable 
had changed over time.   Figure 6 plots the actual poverty rate as well as the predictions from 
changing labor market opportunity variables, one variable at a time.   The dashed line, for 
example, shows our estimate of what would have happened to the poverty rate if median wages 
and inequality had remained at their 1967 levels and only the unemployment rate had fluctuated.  
As expected, the unemployment rate does a good job of predicting the peaks and troughs in the   20
poverty rate over time, although the prediction is quite a bit higher than the actual in the pre-
1982 period. Of particular note, however, is that if median income and inequality are held 
constant, the regression model predicts that trends in the poverty rate should have been upward 
over time.  If the unemployment rate had been the only labor market characteristic that changed 
over time then the poverty rate in 2003 would have been approximately 2 percentage points 
higher than its current level of  12.8 percent.   
Similarly, the solid line in Figure 6 is simulated by holding unemployment and inequality 
constant at their 1967 levels and allowing only the median wage to change.  Again, we see that 
since changes in median wages follow the business cycle, they predict fluctuations in the poverty 
rate, though the relationship is not as strong as the relationship between poverty and 
unemployment.  If unemployment and inequality had been held constant and only the median 
wage had changed, then the poverty rate in 2003 would have been approximately 0.8 percentage 
points higher than it currently is. 
Finally, we show what the poverty rate would have been if unemployment and median 
wages had remained at their 1967 levels, and only the relative wages of the median and 20
th 
percentile workers had changed.   This is given by the line with open circles on Figure 6.  The 
increase in inequality at the bottom of the income distribution over the entire period predicts 
substantial increases in the poverty rate over time.  If only inequality had changed between 1967 
and 2003, the predicted poverty rate in 2003 would be nearly 5 percentage points higher than the 
actual rate.   
In Figure 7, we combine the three labor market variables—median wages, inequality, and 
the unemployment rate--and show how poverty rates would have evolved based on changes in 
these three factors.  As expected, given the predictions from the labor market variables taken   21
individually, the predictions substantially overpredict actual poverty rates by the end of the 
period.   Based on this figure, the surprising aspect of poverty rates over time is not that they did 
not continue to fall from 1980 through 2003, but that they did not increase by more.  One 
possibility is that these estimates ignore another important labor market development over time, 
the increasing fractions of women in the labor force.  Poverty rates may have been held down by 
increasing numbers of women entering the workforce.  To examine this issue, we added to the 
basic regressions an indicator for the fraction of women between the ages of 25 and 64 who are 
working in each division-year cell.  This did not, however, substantially change the regression 
coefficients shown in Table 4, or the predictions summarized in Figure 7.  
The overprediction of poverty rates by labor market factors may be better understood by 
returning to the results in Table 4 showing starkly different coefficients on the labor market 
variables depending on the time period of the estimation.  Because the coefficients on the labor 
market variables fall significantly from 1980 forward, the results based on pooling all years do 
not reflect the apparent change in the relationship between poverty rates and median wages, 
inequality and unemployment rate after 1980.   Blank (1993) notes that the role of economic 
growth (measured by growth in real GNP) in reducing poverty fell significantly during the 
1980s. Blank argues that the economic expansion of the 1980s, unlike previous lengthy 
expansions, was not accompanied by wage growth and so had a different effect on poverty rates.  
As wage inequality grew, and median wages stagnated, economic growth lost some of its power 
to reduce poverty rates. Our results take this finding a step further. Even after conditioning on 
both median wage growth and inequality at the bottom of the wage distribution, we see a 
dramatic reduction in the relationship between macro-level labor market factors and poverty 
rates.    22
To illustrate the importance of this change in the role of labor market factors beginning in 
the 1980s, we first re-estimate model (3) in Table 4 for the period 1980-2003.  Then we perform 
the same predictions as in Figure 6-7 using the estimates from this more narrow time period.  
Figure 8 shows actual poverty rates and those predicted by our three labor market variables.  
Using the weaker relationship between poverty and our labor market indicators after 1980, the 
predicted poverty rates are very close to the actual rates.  The question remains why this 
relationship changed after 1980, but it is clear that median wage growth, rising inequality and the 
evolution of unemployment explain poverty rates well over the past 25 years.  
Finally, as we did with the estimates based on the full sample of years, we have also 
added an indicator for the level of women’s employment to the regressions for the 1980 to 2003 
period.  In this later period, women’s employment has the expected effect, with higher rates of 
female employment decreasing the poverty rate.  The dotted line in Figure 8 shows the pattern of 
poverty rates over time predicted by the three labor market variables and the level of women’s 
employment.  Rising female employment predicts declining poverty rates from 1980 through 
2003.  Thus, including female employment as one of our labor market indicators suggests that 
poverty rates were substantially higher in 2003 than predicted by labor market trends.  An 
interesting question is why the predictive power of these different labor market variables seems 
to be changing over time. 
  Our analysis in this section confirms the central role of the changing wage distribution in 
explaining poverty rates over time.  This point has been made in earlier work by Blank (1993), 
Blank and Card (1993), Freeman (2001), and Gottschalk and Danziger (2003).  Our findings 
echo and strengthen the findings of Blank and Card on the importance of wage inequality to 
poverty, by extending an analysis based on regional variation in labor market opportunities   23
through the 1990s.  We find strong evidence that wage growth and wage inequality (particularly 
inequality at the bottom of the distribution) affect poverty rates during the entire period from 
1969 through 2003.  In fact, we can match the time pattern of poverty rates quite well from 1980 
through 2003 using only variation in the unemployment rate, median wage growth, and changes 
in the lower part of the wage distribution.  This a less than complete explanation for trends in the 
poverty rate, however, since adding a trend in women’s labor force participation from 1980 
forward suggests that poverty rates should have fallen by more than they did, even conditional on 
the evolution of these labor market variables.   Finally, other factors such as demographic 
changes, anti-poverty spending, and immigration may also affect poverty trends.  We next turn to 
these additional factors.  
 
B.  Family Structure 
  In addition to the effects of labor market opportunities and government programs, overall 
poverty rates are affected by demographic changes.  Many previous authors, including Cancian 
and Reed (2001) and Blank and Card (1993), have calculated the extent to which demographic 
changes alone can explain trends in the poverty rate.  Between 1967 and 2003, the fraction of 
non-elderly individuals living in families headed by a single female doubled, from approximately 
6 percent to 12 percent.  Since poverty rates among those in female headed families are typically 
3 or 4 times as high as those for the overall population, such changes in the distribution of family 
types can have potentially large effects on poverty. 
  In Figure 9 we illustrate the changes in poverty that are predicted purely from changes 
over time in the fraction of individuals living in different family types.  Specifically, we calculate 
poverty rates in each year for 6 different family types: married individuals with and without 
children; single females with and without children; and single males with and without children.   24
To produce the predicted poverty trend in Figure 9 we hold constant the poverty rates within 
each family type at their 1967 level, but allow the fraction of individuals living in each family 
type to change.  For comparison, the figure also includes the actual poverty trend. Changes in 
family structure alone predict that poverty rates would have risen from 13.3% in 1967 to 17% in 
2003.  Thus, changes in family types substantially overpredict the actual increase in poverty rates 
over time.   While we do not control for business cycle effects in this figure, a comparison of 
years with similar unemployment rates provides some idea of the predicted versus actual 
comparison abstracting from the effects of the business cycle. In 1999, the unemployment rate 
was 4.6%, similar to the rate at the beginning of our period.  Despite this similarity, the poverty 
rate predicted by family structure changes is 17%, while the actual poverty rate in 1999 is 
somewhat lower than its starting value, at 12.2%. 
  An important question is how the starkly higher poverty rates predicted by the population 
shift towards female headed households were avoided.  Much of the answer echoes our findings 
from the previous section with respect to labor market factors and women’s labor force 
participation between 1980 and 2003.  Cancian and Reed (2001) show that trends in women’s 
labor force participation over this time period offset some of the increases predicted by changes 
in family structure.  The increase in poverty was not as extreme as predicted by the shift to more 
female heads, because many women had rising earnings and rising labor force attachment.  
Increases in education were another countervailing force.  While changes in family structure 
alone do not produce the time pattern of actual poverty rates, they are clearly another factor, 
along with income inequality noted above, that worked against substantial declines in poverty 
rates over time.  
 
C.  Government Tax and Transfer Programs   25
 
Government tax and transfer programs represent an important source of income for the 
poor.  Among the nonelderly poor, the main sources for income support include cash welfare 
benefits (AFDC/TANF
11 and General Assistance) and, more recently, tax benefits (EITC).  In 
addition to these cash based assistance programs are in kind benefits through Food Stamps, 
Medicaid, and housing assistance.  In kind benefits have increased as a share of total means 
tested program spending—in 2002 in kind programs represented about 80 percent of the $522 
billion in federal and state spending on means tested benefits (Burke 2003).  Here we examine 
what role these programs play in explaining nonelderly poverty rates. 
  To understand fully the role played by government transfers, we have to consider both 
the direct and indirect impacts of these programs on income and poverty (Sawhill 1988).  First 
consider AFDC/TANF, which provides cash benefits to low income (primarily female headed) 
families with children.  The income transfers from AFDC will have the direct effect of increasing 
the incomes of the poor.  Because AFDC/TANF benefits are phased out at income levels 
significantly below the poverty line, however, the program may have a smaller effect on poverty 
than on income itself.  Further, the total impact of AFDC may be considerably smaller than the 
direct effect because the structure of program unambiguously discourages work leading to a 
reduction in earnings.  The literature on the work disincentive impacts of AFDC/TANF suggests 
that this negative indirect impact of AFDC/TANF may be large (Moffitt 1983, 1992).   
  In contrast, both the direct and indirect effects of the EITC are expected to increase 
income.  The EITC is a refundable federal tax credit which is targeted to low income working 
families with children.  At very low earnings levels (e.g. up to $7,660 for a family with one child 
in 2003), the EITC is a pure earnings subsidy.  With expansions in the EITC in 1986, 1990, and 
                                                 
11 AFDC was reformed in 1996 and replaced by TANF.     26
1993, the subsidy is quite substantial at 34 (40) percent for families with one child (two or more 
children.  The maximum benefit in 2004 is $2,604 ($4,300) for families with one child (two or 
more children). At higher earnings levels (e.g. beyond $14,040 in 2004) the EITC is phased out.  
Because the EITC transfers income much higher up the income distribution than AFDC/TANF it 
is expected to have much larger impacts on poverty.  As for indirect effects, the EITC is 
expected to increase labor force participation, but may reduce hours worked for those already in 
the labor force. The research, which looks primarily at policy expansions, finds that the EITC has 
led to significant increases in employment for single mothers with little evidence that the credit 
leads to a reduction in hours worked (Eissa and Liebman 1996, Ellwood 2000 and Meyer and 
Rosenbaum 2000, 2001,).
12  Finally, it is important to note that, because the official poverty 
definition is based on pre-tax income, the impact of the EITC on official poverty will reflect only 
its indirect effects on labor supply. 
Over the past 30 years, government spending on in kind transfer programs for the poor 
has far exceeded the spending on cash welfare programs.  For example, between 1990 and 2001, 
real expenditures on Food Stamps increased by 6% and Medicaid increased by 175% compared 
to the 18% decrease in AFDC/TANF expenditures.  Many authors, however, have made the 
point that these and the other in kind programs are not designed to reduce poverty and instead are 
targeted on improving nutrition, increasing access to medical care, etc (Burtless 1995, Blank 
1997).    
  What we can conclude from the above discussion is that, with the exception of the EITC, 
government transfers to the poor are not expected to have large impacts on poverty rates (but 
                                                 
12 The predictions in the text hold for single parents and primary workers in married couples.  The EITC, however, is 
expected to reduce labor force participation and hours worked for secondary earners in low income married couples.  
Eissa and Hoynes 2004 show that these predictions hold in practice, although the behavioral responses are modest in 
size.    27
they may reduce the poverty gap).  Most of the literature on the government transfers and 
poverty compare poverty rates including and excluding different sources of government support, 
thereby focusing only on the direct impacts of the programs.
 13  These studies represent an upper 
bound effect on poverty as they do not consider the indirect impacts the programs have through 
reducing labor supply and earnings.  In a recent study, Scholz and Levine (2001) estimate the 
pre-transfer poverty rate in 1997 to be 29 percent which they compare to a poverty rate of 26.1 
percent after adding in all income conditioned (cash and in kind) transfers.  The EITC has the 
largest anti-poverty effectiveness, with estimates suggesting that the programs lifted 4.9 million 
persons out of poverty in 2002 (Llobrera and Zahradnik 2004).  
Here we contribute to the literature by estimating the impact of transfer programs on 
poverty rates.  We again use the March CPS  to construct variables identical to those used in 
section 4.A.  However, because we wish to take advantage of state level variation in the 
generosity of welfare programs, our analysis is based on variation in  state poverty rates.  We use 
the 1978-2004 CPS surveys, which correspond to data for 1977-2003.  With 27 years of data and 
50 states, our estimation data set contains 1,350 observations.
14 
To explore the impacts of government transfer programs on poverty, we present estimates 
using four alternative measures of welfare generosity.  The first measure, pubwelf, is state 
expenditures on “public welfare” per poor person.  This category includes all income conditioned 
government transfers, including both cash and in kind programs.  The second measure, cashwelf, 
is state expenditures on public welfare less “vendor payments” per poor person.  By removing 
vendor payments (principally Medicaid payments to doctors and hospitals) cashwelf more 
                                                 
13 Two exceptions are Neumark and Wascher (2000) who estimate the impacts of the EITC on poverty rates and 
Schoeni and Blank (2000) who estimate the impact of welfare reform on poverty rates. Both papers measure the 
indirect/behavioral impact of the programs on poverty. 
14 The CPS survey has incomplete data on state identifiers prior to the 1977 survey (1976 data).  However, some of 
our data on welfare spending is available beginning in 1977, so we start the analysis with 1978 March survey.    28
closely corresponds to state cash transfers per poor person.   The data on state expenditures 
comes from the Annual Survey of Governments which has been used recently by Baicker (2001, 
2005) to examine impacts of congressionally mandated Medicaid expansions on state spending.  
We normalize the aggregate state spending by the number of poor persons in the state to obtain a 
measure of generosity, e.g. total resources expended per poor person.  We also estimate models 
with the maximum real AFDC/TANF payment for a family of three persons, maxafdc, and the 
combined maximum real benefit for AFDC/TANF and Food Stamps for a family of three 
persons, maxafdcfs.  These measures are narrower in scope than measures based on total state 
spending.  But they have the advantage of being direct program parameters and therefore do not 
mechanically change with the composition of the population.  Note that all four of these 
measures focus on the transfers and do not include the tax-based EITC. 
To explore the possible role of welfare spending in explaining the trend in poverty rates, 
Figure 10 presents the trends in the four measures of welfare generosity over the sample period.  
Each of the measures is expressed in real terms and is normalized by its value in the first year 
(1977).  All four measures decreased between 1977 and 1983.  After 1983, however, 
AFDC/TANF benefits continued to fall in real terms throughout the period.  Food stamp benefits 
are indexed for inflation, so the combined AFDC/TANF and Food Stamp maximum benefit is 
also declining, but at a slower rate.  Total state cash and in kind welfare spending per poor 
person, on the other hand, increases steadily and at a fairly high rate from 1983 through 2003.  
This appears to be mostly due to Medicaid spending as the total state cash welfare spending per 
poor person increases much more modestly over the period.  
The regression results are presented in Table 5.  All results in the table include state and 
year fixed effects and therefore the impacts of welfare spending are identified using changes in   29
trends in spending across states. The first two columns use pubwelf as the measure of state public 
assistance generosity.  Column (1) shows that a $1000 increase in annual real state cash and in 
kind spending per poor person leads to a 0.5 percentage point reduction in poverty rates. In 
column (2), we add the labor market variables used above in Section 4.A which reduces the 
impact of public welfare variable implying that states with increases in spending also have 
improving labor markets.  Column 3 shows, as expected, if we limit state spending to include 
only cash benefits the estimated impact of public spending on poverty increases by about 75%.  
The results in column (4) show that a $1000 increase in maximum annual AFDC/TANF benefits 
leads to a 0.2 percentage point decrease in poverty rates.  Column (5) shows that a $1000 
increase in combined maximum benefits from AFDC/TANF and food stamps leads to a 0.3 
percentage point decrease in poverty rates.  Overall, the results consistently show that increases 
in welfare spending lead to reductions in poverty rates—however these reductions are quite 
modest.  The last two columns of Table 5 show that the impact of a dollar in maximum benefits 
leads to a much smaller reduction in poverty rates in the later part of the period.  This is 
consistent with the lower take-up rates of public programs following welfare reform (Blank 
2002).  
In Figure 11 we illustrate the changes in poverty that would predicted purely from 
changes over time in public welfare spending per poor person.  The solid line represents poverty 
rates predicted from changes in total cash welfare per poor person (from column 3 of Table 5) 
and the dashed line represents poverty rates predicted from changes in AFDC/TANF and Food 
stamps maximum benefit (from column 5).  These predictions show that changes in welfare 
spending do little to explain the trends over time in the poverty rate.  While changes in total cash 
spending per poor person imply small reductions in poverty and changes in the maximum   30
AFDC/TANF and Food stamp benefits imply small increases in poverty, overall these changes 
are quite small.  This does not imply that such programs fail to improve the well-being of the 
poor, however. 
 
D.  Immigration 
 
Another factor that may contribute to trends in the poverty rate is the rapid growth of the 
foreign born population. For example, since 1980, the fraction of the population who are 
immigrants has doubled.  On average, recent immigrants are less educated and have fewer skills 
than natives, so a higher fraction of them are poor.  Table 6 shows that while 12.4% of natives 
had incomes below the poverty line in 1999, 17.4% of foreign born U.S. residents were living in 
poverty.
15  These differences, combined with the rapid influx of immigrants in recent years, have 
lead some to suggest that immigration is responsible for the fact that the poverty rate has not 
declined more dramatically over time. 
  To evaluate this claim, we divide the population into two mutually exclusive groups—
those who live in families headed by an individual who was born in the United States, and those 
who live in families headed by an individual who was born abroad.  We use data from the 
Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (Census) rather than the CPS because the CPS does not 
include information on country of birth prior to 1993.  Table 6 shows that between 1959 and 
1999 the poverty rate among U.S. natives fell by almost 50%,  from 20.6% to 12.4%, whereas 
poverty among the foreign born increased by 3 percentage points.  The year 1959 is probably a 
poor starting point, however, since the poverty rate fell so much between 1959 and 1969, while 
changes in the immigrant population occurred much later.  A growing and increasingly low-
income immigrant population cannot explain much of the trend in poverty prior to 1980.  On the 
                                                 
15 Calculated from the 2000 Census.   31
other hand, if we focus on the second half of the period, we see that while poverty rates among 
natives have changed little, poverty rates among immigrants have increased by nearly two 
percentage points, and the fraction of the population that is foreign born has increased by six 
percentage points. Taken together, these changes should put upward pressure on the poverty rate, 
but how much movement in the poverty rate do they imply? 
  To answer this question, we decompose changes in poverty over time by looking at 
changes in poverty within the two groups (immigrants and natives), and changes in the 
representation of the two groups in the population.   We begin by considering the extent to which 
overall poverty would have declined if the share of immigrants had increased over time but 
immigrants and natives had remained at the same level of poverty as in 1979.  We construct a 
counterfactual level of overall poverty for each year, holding poverty rates for the two groups 
constant at their 1979 levels, but allowing the population shares for each group to change.  The 
results of this exercise are presented in Figure 12.  We find that the increase in the immigrant 
share of the population would have increased the poverty rate by about 0.2 of a percentage point 
if the income distribution among immigrants had remained constant.  In other words, the level of 
poverty among immigrants had stayed the same as it was in 1979, the rising share of immigrants 
would have increased the poverty rate from 12.3% (1979) to 12.5% (1999), a number that is only 
slightly bigger than the actual value of 12.4%. 
  We also consider the effects of changes over time in the fraction of immigrants who are 
poor.   If we hold population shares and native poverty rates constant at their 1979 levels, but 
allow poverty rates among immigrants to vary across Census years then the predicted overall 
poverty rate in 1999 is about 0.1 percentage point higher than its 1979 level.  Figure 12 suggests 
that although recent immigrants are poorer than their predecessors, their fraction of the   32
population is simply too small to effect the overall poverty rate by much.  These calculations are 
based on an important assumption, however, which is that large influxes of immigrants do not 
reduce job opportunities available to natives.  If the presence of immigrant workers depresses 
native’s wages then the overall impact of immigration on the poverty rate will be higher.  
Evidence on the labor market effects of immigration is mixed (see Borjas 1999, for an overview 
of this literature), thus, it is safest to consider these estimates as lower bounds.   
 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
  Relative to the large decline that was experienced during the 1960’s, poverty rates have 
changed very little over the past three decades.   A number of studies have suggested that the 
lack of improvement in the poverty rate reflects a weakened relationship between poverty and 
the macro-economy.  We find that this relationship has weakened over time, but in spite of this, 
changes in labor market opportunities predict changes in the poverty rate rather well.  Holding all 
else equal, changes in female labor supply should have reduced poverty further, but an increase 
in the rate of female headship may have worked in the opposite direction.  Other factors that are 
often cited as having important effects on the poverty rate do not appear to play an important 
role:  these include changes in the number and composition of immigrants, and changes in the 
generosity of anti-poverty programs. 
  To be sure, the analyses presented in this paper are incomplete in that they do not reflect 
the many indirect mechanisms through which poverty rates may be influenced.  For example, we 
do not attempt to incorporate possible behavioral responses of family structure choices to 
changing labor market opportunities, nor do we account for the possible influence of 
immigration on native’s labor market opportunities.  Nevertheless, even our simple analyses   33
reveal that changes in poverty rates reflect a complex combination of changes in demographics 
and changes in labor market conditions.   
  Several questions remain for future work.  In particular, what are the relationships 
between women’s labor force participation, female headship, labor market opportunities for 
women, and poverty rates?  Many analyses have linked two or three of these factors, but there 
may be important interactions between all of these that help determine the evolution of poverty 
rates.  A related question is why rising women’s labor force participation prior to 1980 does not 
push down poverty rates.  Finally, what explains the change in the responsiveness of poverty to 
macroeconomic indicators starting in the 1980s?  We show that it is not a simple matter of 
controlling more fully for wage growth and inequality; even after conditioning on these factors 
we see changes in the effects of key determinants of the poverty rate after 1980.   Labor market 
measures play an important role in determining overall poverty rates, but their role has changed 
over time, and they are likely to interact in important ways with demographic and other social 
changes.  
   34
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Table 1 
Poverty Rates by Individual and Family Characteristics, 2003 
    
 
Percent Poor 
All     12.5 
Non-elderly   12.8 
      
Non-elderly and:     
  Age < 18    17.6 
 Male    11.7 
 Female    13.9 
  Married head of family    7.0 
  Single head of family with kids  40.3 
  Single head of family no kids  17.9 
 White,  non-hispanic    8.2 
 Black    24.3 
 Hispanic    22.5 
 Native-born    11.8 
 Immigrant    17.4 
  Family head < 12 years of schooling  31.3 
  Family head at least 12 years of schooling  9.6 
 
Source:  Authors’ tabulations of the 2004 March CPS.  The age, gender, race and 
ethnicity are assigned using the individual’s characteristics. Family type, immigrant 
status, and education are assigned based on characteristics of the head of the family.   38
 
Table 2 
Characteristics of the Non-elderly Poor, 2003 
Percent with given characteristic 
        Among non-elderly poor   Among all non-elderly
  Age < 18    39.8%   28.8%
 Male    45.5%   49.8%
 Female    54.5%   50.2%
 Family  structure  is       
   Married    35.0%   66.6%
   Single  with  kids  39.1%   14.4%
    Single without kids  25.8%   18.9%
 White      42.2%   65.7%
 Black    24.1%   12.6%
 Hispanic    26.8%   15.1%
  Family head's education       
    < high school  35.3%   14.4%
 Native-born    82.6%   87.4%
 Immigrant    17.4%   12.6% 
  Head worked last year  50.0%   81.1%
 
Source: Authors’ tabulations of the 2004 March CPS.  The age, gender, race and ethnicity are 
assigned using the individual’s characteristics. Family type, immigrant status, education, and 
employment are assigned based on characteristics of the head of the family.   39
 
Table 3 
Poverty Persistence by Individual and Family Characteristics 
Fraction of those becoming poor who are poor for more than 5 of next 10 years 
               
          Blacks    Whites 
Age 1 at start of poverty spell       
  Male head of family         
  
Head < high school 
education 55.6%  27.6% 
  
Head >= high school 
education 33.3%  16.7% 
             
  Female head of family       
  
Head < high school 
education 89.5%  63.0% 
  
Head >= high school 
education 68.9%  47.3% 
             
Age 20 at start of poverty spell    
  Male head of family       
  
Head < high school 
education 26.4%  13.0% 
  
Head >= high school 
education 11.2%  7.7% 
             
  Female head of family       
  
Head < high school 
education 64.1%  39.6% 
  
Head >= high school 
education 39.1%  26.4% 
               
 
Source: Stevens (1999), Table 6.   40
Table 4 
Estimates of the Impact of Labor Market Opportunities on Poverty Rates, Division Level 
Analysis 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Unemployment  rate  0.413 0.699 0.453 0.898 0.388 0.394 
  (0.045) (0.067) (0.056) (0.150) (0.111) (0.108) 
Ln(real median weekly wage)  -0.228  -0.243 -0.145 -0.251 -0.146 -0.135 
  (0.011) (0.010) (0.017) (0.060) (0.026) (0.025) 
Ln(median/20th  percentile)  0.103 0.240 0.262 0.266  -0.011  0.094 
  (0.011) (0.017) (0.021) (0.036) (0.042) (0.023) 
Constant  1.556 1.611 0.943 1.612 1.041 0.934 
  (0.079) (0.067) (0.115) (0.393) (0.177) (0.168) 
Year fixed effects    X  X  X  X  X 
Division fixed effects      X  X  X  X 
        
Sample years  1967-2003 1967-2003 1967-2003 1967-1979 1980-1989 1990-2003 
Observations  333   333   333   117   90   126  
R-squared  0.70 0.82 0.91 0.94 0.94 0.95 
Notes: Data are at division-year level and cover 1967-2003..  All dollar figures are in 2003 dollars. Regressions 
are weighted using division population.  Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Source: Authors’ tabulations of the 1968-2004 March CPS. 
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Table 5 
Estimates of the Impact of Labor Market Opportunities and Public Welfare Spending on Poverty 
Rates, State Level Analysis 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Pubwelf  (in  $1000s  per  poor)  -0.0051  -0.0041       
  (0.0006)  (0.0005)       
cashwelf    (in  $1000s  per  poor)     -0.0073      
     (0.0008)      
maxafdc  (in  $1000s/year)      -0.0020     
      (0.0007)     
maxafdcfs  (in  $1000s/year)      -0.0029  -0.0026  -0.0007 
       (0.0010)  (0.0016)  (0.0018) 
Unemployment  rate    0.432 0.473 0.467 0.467 0.377 0.351 
    (0.035) (0.034) (0.037) (0.037) (0.051) (0.070) 
Ln  (real  median  weekly  wage)    -0.065 -0.091 -0.096 -0.096 -0.086 -0.074 
    (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.017) (0.019) 
Ln  (median/20th  percentile)    0.074 0.078 0.097 0.097 0.082 0.074 
    (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.017) (0.014) 
Constant  0.152 0.501 0.661 0.670 0.684 0.630 0.553 
  (0.006) (0.065) (0.066) (0.071) (0.070) (0.105) (0.119) 
Year  fixed  effects  X X X X X X X 
State  fixed  effects  X X X X X X X 
















Observations  1350 1350 1350 1350 1350  650  700 
R-squared  0.83 0.87 0.87 0.84 0.84 0.86 0.87 
Notes: Data are at state-year level and cover 1977-2003.  All dollar figures are in 2003 dollars. Regressions 
are weighted using division population.  Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Source: Authors’ tabulations of the 1978-2004 March CPS.   
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Table 6 




  Persons in households 
headed by a natives
Persons in households 







population poverty  rate
%  of 
population  
1959 20.63    20.91 95.79 14.13 4.21 
1969 12.42    12.47 95.90 11.18 4.10 
1979 12.28    12.07 93.99 15.60 6.01 
1989 12.89    12.45 91.37 17.53 8.63 
1999 12.44    11.76 87.88 17.42 12.12 
 
Source: Authors’ tabulations of 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000 Census files.   43
Figure 1 

























































Note: Data are incomplete in the early years.   44
Figure 2 
























































Note: Data are incomplete in the early years.  45
Figure 3 
Percent of Persons who are Poor Under Alternative Definitions of Economic Unit, 1967-2003 
 
 






















Little Family Official Definition Household  46
Figure 4 
Poverty Rates, Unemployment Rates and Median Wages, 1967-2003 
 
Figure 5 
Poverty Rates and Inequality, 1967-2003 
 






























































































































































Nonelderly Poverty Rate Median Wage/20thP Wage  47
Figure 6 
Effect of Changes in Labor Market Opportunities on Poverty Rates 
 
 












































Actual Predicted, Urate Predicted, Med Wage Predicted, 50/20  48
Figure 7 




































































































Notes: Authors’ tabulations of 1968-2004 CPS.   49
 
Figure 8 
























































































































actual predicted by all labor market variables predicted by all labor market & women's lfp
 
 
Notes: Authors’ tabulations of 1981-2004 CPS.   50
Figure 9 





































actual predicted by changes in family structure
 
 
Notes: Authors’ tabulations of 1968-2004 CPS. 
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Figure 10 




Effect of Changes in Public Welfare Spending on Poverty Rates 









































































































Actual Predicted, Cash Welfare Predicted, AFDC&FS Maxben  52
Figure 12 





















Poverty rate predicted by changing immigrant/native shares




Notes: Authors tablations of 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000 Census files. 